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TPP and Environmental Regulation
Errol Meidinger*

I. Introduction
The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) provisions for the environment and natural resource policies have the stated purposes “to promote mutually supportive trade and
environmental policies; promote high levels of environmental protection and effective enforcement of environmental laws; and enhance the capacities of the Parties to address trade-
related environmental issues.”1 They do so in a particular way, however, and contribute to
building a specific kind of economic order. To understand the environmental provisions it
is helpful to understand them in the context of the order they implicitly help to construct.
This article analyzes TPP’s environmental provisions as elements of a broader project that
seeks to institute megaregulatory relationships and to drive broad institutional alignment
through the establishment of megaregional trade agreements. It aims to describe and assess
the ways in which the environmental provisions help to reconfigure regulatory arrangements among participants in the Trans-Pacific megaregion so as to facilitate cross-border
business transactions and transnational economic integration, while largely side-stepping
the environmental effects of increased trade and minimizing new substantive requirements.
Although President Trump’s withdrawal of the United States from TPP changes its immediate reach,2 the TPP’s new mantle as the eleven-member Comprehensive Progressive
Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) continues to represent a powerful model
for major trade agreements. TPP was originally negotiated at length among a dozen countries from three continents with quite different economies and interests that together represented over 40% of world GDP and 25% of global trade.3 TPP also provides a complete set of
terms in intensively negotiated language, covering a wide range of matters laid out in thirty
chapters and several annexes, including a chapter devoted to the environment. Because existing language is often used as the basis for subsequent negotiations, there is good reason to
* SUNY Distinguished Professor, Margaret W. Wong Professor of Law, and Director, The Baldy Center for Law
& Social Policy, The State University of New York at Buffalo. This chapter is partly based on an earlier paper entitled “Mega-Regional Trade Agreements and Global Environmental Governance: The Case of the Trans-Pacific
Partnership Agreement” prepared for the Symposium on Global Governance and the Trans-Pacific Partnership
Agreement, University at Buffalo (Nov. 5, 2016). Comments on that paper by participants in that conference, a
University at Buffalo Law Faculty Workshop, and additional comments by Daniel Chow, Trina Hamilton, Meredith
Lewis, Paul Mertenskötter, Margaret Shannon, and Richard Stewart, are gratefully acknowledged, as is support
from the Baldy Center for Law & Social Policy and the School of Law of the State University of New York at Buffalo.
1 TPP, art. 20.2.1.
2 But see Alan Rappeport, “Mnuchin Floats Rejoining Trans-Pacific Partnership, Trade Deal Trump Shelved”
New York Times (New York, Feb. 27, 2018).
3 Fukunari Kimura and Lurong Chen, “Implications of Mega Free Trade Agreements for Asian Regional
Integration and RCEP Negotiation” (2016) Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia Policy Brief No.
2016-03 https://perma.cc/4X2X-6BQM.
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believe that TPP will become an important reference point4 and that some of its provisions
may even be directly incorporated in future trade agreements.5
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section II describes the context in which TPP was negotiated, including the environmental problems posed by increased trade and the history
of environmental provisions in trade agreements. Section III summarizes the key environmental provisions of TPP, in sufficient detail to provide a good overall grasp of them.
Overall, this chapter’s analysis finds them relatively weak in terms of both substantive requirements and implementation institutions, but acknowledges some potential value to
including environmental provisions in trade agreements. Section IV analyzes the environmental provisions in terms of the key concepts of megaregulation, including its particular liberal vision of state-economy relationships; the process of regulatory alignment,
economic, and political integration; and engaging and countering Chinese environmental
policy. Section V concludes that TPP’s environmental provisions, while important, do not
embody a governance system capable of controlling the relentless degradation of the environment by continually intensifying economic activity.

II. Trade and the Environment
A. Free Trade Agreements in International Trade Law
TPP is the most recent iteration in a long series of free trade agreements (FTAs) advanced
primarily by developed countries to reshape the terms of international trade. The main attraction of FTAs is that they allow two or more countries to establish special trading privileges among themselves that are unavailable to other countries, even if they are members
of the WTO.6 FTAs, and their cousin customs unions, are often used as tools in forming
geopolitical alliances that extend beyond liberalized trade, and thus should be understood
as geostrategic arrangements. This is particularly true of the recent spate of “megaregional”
FTAs (MRTAs), such as TPP, the EU–US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
(TTIP), the EU–Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), and the
ASEAN plus-six Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which generally
include ten or more countries and extend beyond contiguous geographical regions.7 MRTAs
are aimed not only at reducing traditional trade barriers, but also at shaping various aspects
of what previously were viewed as mainly internal matters, including anti-corruption
4 Sikina Jinnah and Abby Lindsay, “Diffusion Through Issue Linkage: Environmental Norms in US Trade
Agreements” (2017) 16 Global Environmental Pol 41–61.
5 Todd Allee and Manfred Elsig, “Are the Contents of International Treaties Copied-and-Pasted? Evidence from
Preferential Trade Agreements” (2016) World Trade Institute Working Paper No. 8 https://perma.cc/ZN84-ZD4H.
6 GATT, art. XXIV.
7 TPP members include Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru,
Singapore, United States (formerly, and perhaps in the future), and Vietnam. TTIP (Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership), currently on hold, includes the United States and European Union, with its 28 member
countries. CETA, the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, is between Canada and the EU. RCEP
(the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership) involves Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, China (very importantly), India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea,
Thailand, and Vietnam, and is often seen as a direct competitor for the TTP. Meredith Kolsky Lewis, “Mega-FTAs
and Plurilateral Trade Agreements: Implications for the Asia-Pacific” in J. Chaisse and others (eds.), Paradigm
Shift in International Economic Law Rule-Making: Economics, Law, and Institutions in Asia Pacific (Springer
Singapore 2017); Daniel C. K. Chow, “How the United States Uses the Trans-Pacific Partnership to Contain China
in International Trade” (2017) Chicago J Intl L 370–402.
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policy, business organization law, competition policy, consumer protection, data protection, domestic environmental law, intellectual property, labor law, and other areas.8

B. Trade Growth and the Environment
A central purpose of trade agreements has always been to stimulate increased trade, and,
through the operation of the principle of comparative advantage, to increase total economic
welfare. Practically, this will typically be achieved by countries producing more of what they
can produce most cheaply and purchasing other products from their trading partners. It
seems common sense that increased production and resulting increased transportation will
consume more materials and energy, in turn leading to more environmental harm.9 There
is a counter theory, which argues that increased production will initially lead to environmental degradation, but then to higher environmental standards due to increased wealth.
This is the “environmental Kuznets curve,” named for the economist Simon Kuznets, who
argued in the mid-20th century that economic development would first increase and then
decrease economic inequality after a certain level of wealth was achieved. However, the
environmental Kuznets curve has not fared well under empirical scrutiny, as developing
countries have manifested highly variable patterns, but rarely shown significantly decreased
environmental damage.10 Moreover, it is important to understand patterns across both developed and developing countries in a transnational trading system. Increased trade poses
risks of countries intentionally reducing environmental regulation to compete with other
producers (competitiveness effects), as well as having environmental regulations overridden by agreements that privilege international trade (regulatory effects).11
While empirical findings on the environmental effects of liberalized trade are variable,
there are good reasons for thinking that increased trade adds to environmental problems
more often than not, and unevenly so.12 In one particularly systematic study, Le, Chang, and
Park analyzed panel data for 98 countries from around the world for the years 1990 to 2013.
They found a positive long-term relationship between trade openness, economic growth,
and particulate air pollution emissions (scale effects). However, they also found that trade
openness generally had benign environmental effects in developed countries, while having
deleterious ones in middle and low income countries (composition effects).13
That trade agreements appear to have a propensity to increase environmental damage in
developing countries places a distinctive normative burden on them. One line of response
is that developing countries may still be better off than they otherwise would be, since
they can use acceptance of environmental harm as part of their comparative advantage
and thereby garner economic growth.14 In a world increasingly committed to the ideals of
8 Henrik Horn, Petros C. Mavroidis, and André Sapir, Beyond the WTO? An Anatomy of EU and US Preferential
Trade Agreements (Bruegel Blueprint Series 2007).
9 Daniel C. Esty, Greening the GATT: Trade, Environment, and the Future (Institute for International Economics 1994).
10 David Stern, “The Rise and Fall of the Environmental Kuznets Curve” (2004) 32 World Development 1419–39.
11 Esty, Greening the GATT.
12 Eg Jevan Chermichwan, Brian R. Copeland, and M. Scott Taylor, “Trade and the Environment: New Methods,
Measurements, and Results” (2017) 9 Annual Rev Econ 59–85.
13 Thai-
Ha Le, Youngho Chang, and Donghyun Park, “Trade Openness and Environmental
Quality: International Evidence” (2016) 92 Energy Poly 45–55.
14 Jagdish Bhagwati, “Trade and the Environment: Law, Economics, and Policy” in D. Zaelke and others (eds.),
Trade and Environment: The False Conflict? (Island Press 1993) 159–90.
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human dignity and equality, however, and one in which the negative effects of low levels of
environmental protection are becoming more obvious and more acute in developing countries, that response is becoming unpalatable. Hence, proponents of trade agreements argue
that they can be designed not only to minimize environmental harm, but also to reduce it
from what it would have been absent the trade agreement. Indeed, the United States Trade
Representative argued that TPP would do so.15

C. Environmental Provisions in Trade Agreements
Environmental provisions in trade agreements date back at least to the GATT of 1947,
which provided exceptions for otherwise prohibited state measures “necessary to protect
human, animal, or plant life or health”16 or “relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources”17 provided they did not arbitrarily or unjustly discriminate among countries
with similar conditions, or function as disguised trade restrictions.18
Affirmative environmental duties appeared in US-involved trade agreements starting
with the North American Free Trade Agreement of 1994 (NAFTA), which included early
forms of many provisions in TPP. Most were in an environmental side agreement negotiated by the Clinton administration in response to criticisms of the primary text originally
negotiated by the GHW Bush administration. They included, among other things, commitments to: (1) shared environmental principles and objectives; (2) ongoing cooperation
on environmental matters; (3) maintaining environmental laws with high levels of protection and enforcement, and striving to improve them; (4) publishing all environmental
laws, regulations, procedures and rulings; (5) public notice and comment on proposed
regulations; (6) domestic enforcement procedures to remedy environmental violations,
including possible private rights to seek redress; (7) a new Commission for Environmental
Cooperation with authority to investigate parties’ enforcement practices; (8) an investor–
state dispute resolution (ISDS) system allowing investors from one member state to challenge in a third-party forum environmental and other laws of another member state alleged
to discriminate against foreign investments, violate minimum standards of fairness, or
directly or indirectly expropriate their investments; and (9) potential monetary sanctions
and trade penalties following an arbitral panel finding of “a persistent pattern of failure
by [a]Party . . . to effectively enforce its environmental law.”19 This was the first time trade
sanctions were made available to enforce an environmental duty. The main text also provided that specific multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs)—the Convention on
International Trade of Endangered Species, the Montreal Ozone Protocol, and the Basel
Convention on Hazardous Wastes—would trump any inconsistent NAFTA provisions.20
Subsequent trade agreements involving the United States generally followed the NAFTA
pattern, with minor revisions and clarifications, and moved environmental obligations into
15 Office of the United States Trade Representative, “The Transpacific Partnership: Preserving the Environment”
https://perma.cc/Z7EY-6EBR.
16 GATT, art. XX (b).
17 ibid. art. XX(g).
18 ibid. art. XX (chapeau).
19 North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation Between the Government of Canada, the
Government of the United Mexican States and the Government of the United States of America (1993) arts. 34, 35,
36; Annex 3 https://perma.cc/DS29-454Q.
20 NAFTA, art. 104(1).
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the primary texts. Following the 2006 mid-term election, public debates regarding ongoing
FTA negotiations with Columbia, Panama, Peru, and South Korea gave rise to the bipartisan “May 10, 2007 Agreement” between Congress and the President that required the incorporation of seven named MEAs in all US trade agreements; a binding obligation not to
derogate from environmental laws in a manner affecting trade or investment; and subjection of all environmental obligations to the same dispute settlement mechanisms applicable
to other provisions.21
Since NAFTA, the number of trade agreements with environmental provisions has
steadily increased. The agreements have drawn upon a common pool of environmental
norms, which, by one careful estimate, now total nearly 300.22 The average number of environmental norms in recent trade agreements is in the mid-60s. New trade agreements tend
to be based closely on recent ones,23 making TPP an important template for future trade
agreements and a valuable case for analysis of the current state of megaregulation. This is
especially so given that the environmental chapter remains almost unchanged in CPTPP,
despite the United States no longer being present to promote its preferences. As a basis for
this analysis, the next section provides a detailed look at the TPP environmental provisions.

III. Environmental Provisions in the TPP
Most of the TPP environmental provisions are collected in a chapter titled simply
“Environment.”24 Several other chapters, particularly on investor–state dispute resolution
and regulatory coherence, also have significant environmental implications. Substantive
topics addressed in Chapter 20 cover a relatively wide range, including: endangered species protection; illegal timber, fish, and wildlife trafficking; marine pollution control; ozone
layer protection; fisheries subsidies; environmental law enforcement; general environmental cooperation; and increased environmental technology transfer. Climate change is
not mentioned, although the importance of “transition to a low emissions economy” and
cooperation on matters such as energy efficiency, low emissions technologies, sustainable
transport, and the like are acknowledged.25

A. General Obligations
The specific topics just noted are preceded by an article on “general commitments.” After
restating the customary international law maxim affirming “the sovereign right of each
Party to establish its own levels of domestic environmental protection and its own environmental priorities, and to establish, adopt or modify its environmental laws and policies,”26
the Agreement states three general duties. First, “[e]ach Party shall strive to ensure that its
21 Office of the United States Trade Representative, Bipartisan Agreement on Trade Policy (2007) (incorporated
in HR 1314 by substitute amendment and passed on May 22, 2007).
22 Jean Frédéric Morin, Joost Pauwelyn, and James Hollway, “The Trade Regime as a Complex Adaptive
System: Exploration and Exploitation of Environmental Norms in Trade Agreements” (2017) 20(2) J Intl Econ L
365–90.
23 ibid.
24 TPP, art. 20.
25 TPP, art. 20.15.
26 ibid. art. 20.3.2.
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environmental laws and policies provide for, and encourage, high levels of environmental
protection and to continue to improve its respective levels of environmental protection,”27
echoing similar language in NAFTA.
This provision illustrates the semantic choices involved in articulating a legal duty.
On one hand the charge is mandatory, as indicated by the term “shall.” On the other, it is
vague: “shall strive to ensure . . . provide for and encourage . . . high levels of environmental
protection.” An obvious problem is that it may be difficult to determine whether or not this
duty has been met. It is possible to argue that any action whatsoever seeking to improve environmental protection could constitute fulfillment of the duty, regardless of how small or
ineffectual it is. If so, the obligation, while ostensibly mandatory, would be largely meaningless. Conversely, it could also be argued that the duty has meaning—that “strive,” ‘ensure,”
“high levels,” and so on can be ascertained in practice; or, more importantly, that failure to
do so can be ascertained.
However, since the actor and complainant are likely to disagree, legal agreements
often have arrangements for authoritative determination. This is typically done by a third
party who can produce binding rulings and thereby give meaning to the general or vague
terms of the duty. The availability of such an authoritative interpreter can be seen as another dimension of a legally binding obligation. Thus, in assessing a duty or right in a
trade agreement, it is helpful to look at its levels of: (1) obligation (mandatory language),
(2) precision (clarity of duty), and (3) institutionalization (mechanisms for elaboration
and adjudication).28
In general, TPP has relatively weak institutional arrangements for adjudicating compliance with the environmental chapter. Only member countries can bring official complaints,
and only after engaging in an elaborate series of increasingly high level consultations.
These begin with party-to-party consultations, then move up to representatives on the
Environment Committee (composed of senior trade and environment officials from each
party), and then to top level ministerial consultations.29
If such consultations among the parties fail, disputants can resort to the agreement-
wide dispute settlement procedure laid out in Chapter 28. While the process has variants,
and allows the parties to opt for alternative forms of dispute resolution, its main settlement mechanism is the classical three member arbitration panel: one member chosen
by the complaining party, one by the responding party, and a third either by the complainant and respondent together or, failing that, by their chosen two panel members.30 If
the panel concludes that the responding party has failed to meet its obligations under the
Agreement, the respondent is to correct the problem within a reasonable time. If it does
not, the complaining party can suspend benefits of the agreement to the respondent (for
example, tariff reductions) proportional to the level of the violation, subject to review by
the panel.
The arbitral panel is a standard dispute settlement institution for international agreements. Here it is potentially more potent than in most MEAs, because violations of the
environmental commitments can potentially result in trade sanctions. However, its effectiveness in this area remains subject to considerable doubt, since research has uncovered no
27
28
29
30

ibid.
Kenneth W. Abbott and others, “The Concept of Legalization” (2000) 54 Intl Org 17–35.
TPP, arts. 20.19, 20.20, 20.21, 20.22, 20.23.
TPP, art. 28.9 ff.
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instance of the dispute settlement procedure actually being used to enforce environmental
obligations in a trade agreement to which the United States is a party.31
TPP also provides opportunities for individuals or organizations within (but only
within) member states to submit complaints regarding their state’s implementation of the
environment chapter. While it would be new for some countries, that process is limited to
public disclosure. The party receiving the submission (that is, the country whose behavior
is complained of) must respond in writing within a reasonable time and publicize both the
submission and its response.32 There is no obligation to give reasons for such decisions.
Submissions and responses are not evaluated by third parties, although they can be reviewed by the Committee on Environment if a member state other than the one complained
of requests such a review.33 However, unlike the Secretariat in the US–Peru trade agreement
and several others,34 the Committee apparently has no authority to create a factual record.
The provision relies entirely on publicity to prompt any changes in party behavior. Parties
are also free to make citizen submissions more onerous by requiring that submitters explain how the issue raised affects trade or investment between the parties,35 an evidentiary
requirement that may be difficult for many submitters to fulfill, as discussed regarding the
“effective enforcement” provision below.
A second general obligation in Chapter 20 is that “[n]o Party shall fail to effectively enforce its environmental laws through a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction
in a manner affecting trade or investment between the parties.”36 While this provision is
also vague, “effective enforcement” seems a potentially more demanding and more determinate duty than “strive to ensure.” It too, however, is subject to significant loosening. First,
the only enforcement failures covered are those “affecting trade or investment between the
parties.” Second, the next paragraph recognizes parties’ rights to “exercise discretion regarding: (a) investigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory and compliance matters; and (b) the allocation of environmental resources with respect to other environmental laws determined
to have higher priorities.”37 Enforcement decisions and resource allocation are traditionally
areas of high discretion in administrative law, so it is not surprising that high discretion is
preserved here. Nonetheless, the paragraph defines compliance as “reasonable” exercises of
prosecutorial discretion and “bona fide” resource allocation decisions in accordance with
national enforcement priorities, thus imposing at least some nominal limitations on administrative discretion.

31 Chris Wold, “Empty Promises and Missed Opportunities: an Assessment of the Environment Chapter of the
Trans-Pacific Partnership” (2016) https://perma.cc/7CRW-EY4Q. Professor Wold, an authority in this field, confirmed that this finding still holds in an email communication of January 26, 2018. Moreover, until very recently,
the US was effectively the only developed country that sought to attach possible trade sanctions to violations of
environmental obligations in trade agreements. R. V. Anuradha, “WTO to the TPP: Evolution of Environmental
Provisions in Trade Agreements” in J. Chaisse and others (eds.), Paradigm Shift in International Economic Law
Making: Economics, Law, and Institutions in the Asia Pacific, (Springer Nature Singapore, 2017). Thus, while comprehensive research covering every trade agreement in existence does not appear to be available, this research on
agreements in which the US is involved can be treated as indicating that there have been very few, and very probably no, trade dispute processes over environmental provisions.
32 TPP, art. 20.9.1.
33 TPP, art. 20.9.4.
34 US Government Accountability Office, “Free Trade Agreements: Office of the US Trade Representative
Should Continue to Improve Its Monitoring of Environmental Commitments” GAO-15-161 (Nov. 2014).
35 TPP, art. 20.9.2.d.
36 TPP, art. 20.3.4.
37 TPP, art. 20.3.5.
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Application of this provision seems likely to be challenging in practice. While there have
been no disputes involving the environmental enforcement requirement, a recent decision
of a dispute panel regarding a very similar labor requirement,38 held that the United States,
in claiming that Guatemala failed to effectively enforce its labor laws, would have to show
that those enforcement failures conferred an empirically demonstrable competitive advantage on the non-enforcing party. Because it managed to do so in only one of eight instances,
it did not meet the dual requirements of showing (1) “a sustained or recurring course of
action” that (2) also affects trade by conferring a competitive advantage.39 The challenge
in the environmental context would likely be at least as great, since it would be difficult to
demonstrate a sustained or recurring course of action in the first place—especially without
the equivalent of worker groups to complain, and then even more so to show empirically
that such a course of action created a competitive advantage.
Third, TPP seeks to establish a constraint on the weakening of national environmental
law for the purpose of enhancing competitive advantage: “a Party shall not waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer to waive or otherwise derogate from, its environmental laws in a
manner that weakens or reduces the protection afforded in those laws in order to encourage
trade or investment between the Parties.” While this provision can be seen as seeking to place
a ratchet constraint on any potential race to the bottom, it is limited by the phrase “in order
to . . .,” which implies a need both to show intent and to show an intent specifically directed
to increasing trade or investment with the relatively few other parties to the agreement.
As a practical matter, such questions of state intent will always be difficult to prove.
International trade jurisprudence in general has struggled with whether to require an empirical showing of intent on the part of the acting country or essentially to infer intent from
action, which seems likely to make the conclusion equally arbitrary.40 Whether this provision has any practical effect will be interesting to see. On one hand, it is possible to imagine
parties jealously observing each other’s environmental regulatory behavior and bringing
claims when they feel aggrieved. On the other hand, parties may be quite hesitant to bring
environmental claims, both because they are difficult and expensive to prove, and because
they could trigger retaliation.

B. General Institutional Arrangements
As noted, one of the factors that helps make international agreements binding in practice is
that they come with a set of institutional mechanisms to help make them happen. In addition to the dispute settlement apparatus described above, there is a general committee—the
Trans-Pacific Partnership Commission—composed of senior delegations from and selected
by each Party.41 The Commission is responsible for overall implementation and can create

38 The CAFTA-DR requirement, art. 16.2.1(a), “A Party shall not fail to effectively enforce its labor laws, through
a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction, in a manner affecting trade between the Parties, after the date
of entry into force of this Agreement,” is identical to that of the TPP, art. 16.2.1(a).
39 Final Report of the Panel, In the Matter of Guatemala—Issues Relating to the Obligations Under Article
16.2.1(a) of the CAFTA-DR, Dominican Republic—Central America—United States Free Trade Agreement (June
14, 2017) paras 503–507.
40 Robert E. Hudec, “GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regulation: Requiem for an ‘Aim and Effects’ Test”
(1998) 32 Intl Lawyer 619–49.
41 TPP, art. 27.1.
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other ad hoc or standing committees.42 It is to make decisions by consensus,43 meaning “no
Party present at any meeting when a decision is taken objects to the proposed decision.”44
This appears to be a fairly strict standard, since it gives each Party an effective veto power.
This could mean that the Commission will have a hard time making decisions on difficult
questions. Those may therefore have to be addressed through the dispute settlement process, or by general diplomatic activities among the parties, or not at all.
There is also an Environment Committee, composed of senior governmental representatives from the trade and environment ministries of each Party,45 with general and relatively
vague duties. These include monitoring implementation of the Environment chapter and
preparing a written report within three years of TPP’s entry into force,46 providing a forum
for ongoing discussion,47 consulting and coordinating with other committees,48 and the
like. This Committee also is to operate by consensus, unless it agrees by consensus to operate otherwise.49
This limited power of the committees seems to indicate that the parties will retain most
environmental questions regarding TPP implementation in their own domains and do not
intend the treaty apparatus to resolve many of them. TPP simply reiterates a duty to “cooperate to address matters of mutual interest” with regard to various topics.50 On the other
hand, the committees will provide forums for regular discussion and over time are likely
to generate continuing networks for the sharing of ideas and experiences, thus perhaps
leading to considerable alignment in practice.
TPP also aims to shape the internal functioning of national environmental regulatory
programs. Each party is mandated to: (1) ensure that relevant information about its environmental laws, policies, enforcement, and compliance procedures is available to the
public;51 (2) “ensure that an interested person residing or established in its territory may
request that the Party’s competent authorities investigate alleged violations of its environmental laws, and that the competent authorities give those requests due consideration”;52
(3) “ensure that judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative proceedings” for enforcement
are available and “are fair, equitable, transparent and comply with due process of law”;53
(4) “provide appropriate sanctions or remedies for violations of its environmental laws,”
including the possibility of enforcement suits brought by non-state actors, which would
be a novelty in many countries;54 and (5) ensure that such sanctions and remedies “take
appropriate account of relevant factors,” which may include the nature and gravity of the
violation, damage to the environment and any economic benefit the violator derived from
the violation.55
42

ibid. art. 27.2.2.
ibid. art. 27.3.1.
44 ibid.
45 ibid. art. 20.19.2.
46 ibid. art. 20.9.6.
47 ibid. art. 20.9.3.
48 ibid. arts. 20.14.2, 20.19.3(e).
49 ibid. art. 20.19.5.
50 In reference to TPP arts. 20.12.2 (general); 20.5.3 (ozone-
depleting substances); 20.6.3 (ship pollution);
20.13.6 (biodiversity protection); 20.15.2 (energy efficiency, emissions reduction, etc., all implicitly related to climate change).
51 TPP, art. 20.7.1.
52 ibid. art. 20.7.2.
53 ibid.
54 ibid. art. 20.7.5.
55 ibid. art. 20.7.6.
43
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These provisions (public information, complaints procedures, both state and private enforcement mechanisms, procedurally fair and transparent adjudication, effective
and proportional remedies) strongly resemble the typical ideals and features of developed country environmental regulatory systems, and perhaps of the United States in
particular.56 The penalty criteria, for example, could have been taken directly from the
United States Environmental Protection Agency’s penalty policies.57 Moreover, TPP’s
Chapter 25 on “Regulatory Coherence” urges parties to have their agencies consult and
coordinate,58 and to conduct regulatory impact analyses assessing the need for new regulations, examining feasible alternatives, considering their efficiency (including possible
cost-benefit analysis), and relying on the best reasonably attainable information.59
Chapter 8 requires that “Each Party shall allow persons of another Party to participate in
the development of technical regulations, standards and conformity assessment procedures by its central government bodies on terms no less favorable than those it accords to
its own persons.”60
To the degree that these prescriptions and strong recommendations are implemented
by the parties, they are likely to have the effect of facilitating transactions for transnational corporations seeking to do business or establish operations in the member
states. They will do this through gradually aligning the administrative structure and operations of their environmental regulatory programs with each other and with the general pattern advanced by a variety of US and OECD initiatives in recent decades, thus
making host country regulatory arrangements increasingly legible to transnational business actors.
While these prescriptions fit into the “rule of law capacity building” agenda promoted
by powerful developed countries and financial institutions such as the World Bank,61 the
movement for environmental rule of law is considerably broader. It ranges from networks of
environmental officials, such as the International Network for Environmental Compliance
and Enforcement, composed of 4000+ environmental professionals, government and non-
government, around the world,62 to transnational environmental NGOs, including the
World Wildlife Fund,63 International Union for the Conservation of Nature,64 and countless smaller organizations, all of which have taken the position that improved domestic legal
institutions are centrally important to improved environmental governance. These provisions therefore seem likely to have some appeal to environmental interests. Nonetheless,
with the exception of the WWF,65 environmental groups generally have an oppositional

56 For a more thorough analysis of the use of administrative law to promote harmonization and facilitate trade
and investment, see Richard B. Stewart and Paul Mertenskötter, “Megaregulatory Ordering through Transnational
Administrative Law,” ch. 17 in this volume.
57 Eg, EPA, “US EPA Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, Clean Water Act: Section 404
Settlement Penalty Policy” (Dec. 21, 2001) https://perma.cc/K63V-GR7F.
58 TPP, art. 25.7.
59 ibid. art. 25.51–3.
60 ibid. art. 8.7.1.
61 Tor Krever, “The Legal Turn in Late Development Theory: the Rule of Law and the World Bank’s Development
Model” (2011) 52 Harvard Intl L J 287–319.
62 INECE https://perma.cc/5F2T-JF5T.
63 WWF, “WWF Statement on the Close of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations” (Oct. 5, 2015) https://
perma.cc/G46R-WUXH.
64 Jake Brunner, “Implementing Environmental Policy in Viet Nam: IUCN’s Experience” (2016) https://perma.
cc/D3NW-VG7C.
65 WWF, “WWF Statement on the Close of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations.”
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and critical view of TPP.66 Most have taken the position that the environmental protections
in TPP as a whole are not as strong as they should or could be, and that the ISDS provision,
discussed below, is particularly dangerous.67

C. Obligations Tied to Existing Multilateral Environmental Agreements
A portion of Chapter 20 is devoted to linking TPP to existing MEAs to which the TPP
parties are also parties. These include the Montreal Protocol to Protect the Ozone
Layer,68 the “MARPOL” convention aimed controlling ocean pollution from ships,69 and
the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
(CITES).70 For the most part these sections do not articulate new commitments. Instead,
they generally affirm the importance of the goals of the MEAs and require the parties to
“take measures” to pursue those goals or, in the case of CITES, to “adopt, maintain, and implement laws, regulations and other measures to fulfill [their] obligations” under CITES.
In some cases, moreover, the obligations stated by TPP appear to be lower than those that
have been developed under the related MEAs.71 While this does not alter obligations under
the MEAs, it does limit the availability of the TPP dispute settlement process. In addition,
it may be difficult to employ the TPP dispute resolution system to enforce any obligations
under the MEAs, because the complainant must show not only a failure to implement the
MEA, but also that it “affects trade or investment between the parties,” a requirement, as
noted above, that will often be difficult to meet.
It is therefore reasonable to ask why the MEA provisions are even present in TPP, since
they seem not to add any substantive obligations to the underlying MEAs. A cynical answer
might be that they are mere window dressing, providing a patina of environmental concern
in a treaty aimed primarily at expanding environmentally damaging trade and geopolitical
primacy. A more positive response might be that it is nonetheless significant that these environmental obligations are present in a megaregional trade agreement, indicating that they
are inseparable from trade and that trade practices must be responsive to environmental
protection. The linkage thus furthers the message of sustainable development, in which
economic progress, environmental protection, and social justice are inextricably linked.
An additional defense is that TPP should not be used to increase the stringency of MEAs,
to which there are numerous non-TPP member parties. Moreover, TPP does augment the
substantive, trade-related environmental obligations of the parties beyond the MEA context, as discussed in the next section. Finally, it could possibly be the case that, while state
parties would not bring complaints for failure to meet obligations under MEAs, they might
bring them under TPP, if it is apparent that the failure is connected to efforts to gain competitive advantage. As noted above, such claims apparently have not occurred to date, but

66 John Ravenhill, “The Political Economy of the Trans-Pacific Partnership: A ‘21st Century’ Trade Agreement?”
(2016) 22(5) New Pol Econ 1–22.
67 Ilana Solomon, “More than a Dozen Environmental Organizations Warn of Trans-Pacific Partnership Risks”
Sierra Club (Oct. 6, 2015) https://perma.cc/T3PW-YPU2.
68 TPP, art. 20.5.
69 ibid. art. 20.6.
70 ibid. art. 20.17.2.
71 Wold, “Empty Promises and Missed Opportunities.”
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that does not necessarily preclude them in the future, as competition for participation in
transnational value chains becomes increasingly intense.

D. Additional Substantive Provisions
TPP takes up a number of environmentally important questions beyond the MEAs in which
the parties are involved, four of them directly trade related.
1. Invasive species. TPP calls for a preliminary program in which the Committee on
Environment is to coordinate with the Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
to identify cooperative opportunities for information sharing on the movement and control of invasive alien species.72 It is entirely appropriate that TPP address invasive species,
since so many of them are carried to the ecosystems they invade by trade. But this is a quite
limited measure with little prospect of changing trading behavior in the near term and evidently leaving the main priority on unfettered shipping practices. While the committee
processes could conceivably lead to ameliorative measures over the long term, it would be
highly optimistic to expect that they will lead to any significant regulatory changes.
2. Marine Fisheries Depletion. TPP appears to be the first trade agreement to address fisheries depletion. After tacitly acknowledging that inter-party trade plays an important role
in fisheries depletion,73 TPP obligates parties to operate fisheries management systems to
regulate wild capture fishing in a sustainable manner.74 Unlike much of the environmental
chapter, these duties apply extraterritorially, mandating parties to “promote the recovery
of overfished stocks for all marine fisheries in which that Party’s persons conduct fishing
activities”75—that is, potentially in fisheries within the exclusive economic zones of other
parties, or indeed non-parties, or the open seas.
Also significant is the subsidies section, which bars parties from providing fishing subsidies that “negatively affect fish stocks that are in any overfished condition” or to certain
specified types of fishing vessels. While this provision is limited to the approximately 32%
of fish stocks that are classified as overfished,76 and does not address subsidies affecting
stocks that are declining and likely soon to be overfished, it does establish the shared
principle of eliminating environmentally destructive subsidies, potentially a very important advance (especially given the continuing difficulties of the WTO in addressing
the problem).77
Finally, TPP mandates parties to take various actions to combat illegal fishing practices,
including cooperating with each other, not undermining regional fisheries management
organizations, and potentially more importantly: (1) “deter[ing] vessels . . . flying [their] flag
and [their] nationals from engaging in IUU fishing activities”78 and (2) “implement[ing]
port State measures.”79 Like most mandatory environmental measures in TPP, “deter” and
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TPP, art. 20.14.2.
ibid. art. 20.16.1.
74 ibid.
75 ibid. art. 20.16.3.c.
76 FAO, “The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture” (Food and Agriculture Organization 2016) https://
perma.cc/5F88-FK6T.
77 ibid.
78 TPP, art. 20.16.14.b.i.
79 ibid. art. 20.16.14.c.
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“port State measures” are undefined. However, should parties care enough about them in
practice, most likely because of their commercial implications, it is possible they could provide the basis for subsequent definition and elaboration through diplomatic negotiations,
committee processes, eventual protocols, or even dispute processes.
3. Trade in Illegally Harvested Fish, Wildlife and Plants. TPP follows a recent trend of
trying to limit the illegal harvesting of fish, wildlife, and plants (whether or not they are
listed as endangered) by denying access to markets, and thus reducing profitability. Parties
are to share information and experiences,80 cooperate with each other81 and with non-
governmental entities,82 increase efforts to protect their own wild fauna and flora,83 and take
actions to implement their duties under CITES.84 TPP reaches beyond CITES, mandating
that each Party “take measures to combat . . . trade of wild fauna and flora that, based on
credible evidence [as determined by the Party], were taken or traded in violation of that
Party’s or another applicable law [evidently not necessarily even the law of another Party],
the primary purpose of which is to conserve, protect, or manage wild fauna or flora.”85 The
CPTPP suspends the “or another applicable law” provision, together with an explanatory
footnote,86 thus eliminating any duty to control trade in wild flora or fauna taken in violation of another state’s law.87 It thereby removes TPP as a driver of reciprocal extraterritorial
environmental law enforcement, and would seem to significantly reduce its attractiveness
to environmental organizations, many of which have placed great stress on policing illegally
harvested products from other jurisdictions.88 While countries are still free to do so on their
own, as the United States currently does under the amended Lacey Act,89 participation in
TPP is not presently an incentive to do so.
4. Environmental Goods and Services. One way to reduce the damaging and inequitably
distributed environmental effects of increased trade would be to ensure that consumers and
producers in developing countries have access to the most environmentally protective technologies available.90 Currently, that is unlikely to be the case, since advanced technology
is often subject to restrictive tariffs and is typically patented or otherwise kept exclusive so
as to maximize its profitability to those who control it. This makes it inaccessible to many
businesses in developing countries and leads to greater environmental damage per unit
of production than necessary. While TPP contains a provision “recognizing” the importance of trade and investment in environmental goods and services,91 it does little more.
The Environment Committee is charged to consider party-raised issues in the area and
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ibid. art. 20.17.3.a.
ibid. art. 20.17.3.b.
ibid. art. 20.17.4.c.
83 ibid. arts. 20.17.4.a and 20.17.4.b.
84 ibid. art. 2017.2.
85 ibid. art. 20.17.5 “Such measures shall include sanctions, penalties, or other effective measures, including administrative measures, that can act as a deterrent to such trade.”
86 ibid. Fn. 26: “For greater certainty, ‘another applicable law’ means a law of the jurisdiction where the take or
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violation of that law.”
87 Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-
Pacific Partnership, Annex II—List of Suspended
Provisions https://perma.cc/9K5P-H84K.
88 Eg Raffi Khatchadourian, “The Stolen Forests: Inside the Covert War on Illegal Logging” The New Yorker
(New York, Oct. 6, 2008).
89 USC §3372(a)(2).
90 OECD, “Invention and Transfer of Environmental Technologies” (OECD Studies on Environmental
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the parties are mandated to “endeavor to address any potential barriers to trade in environmental goods and services.”92 In other words, TPP recognizes the issue, but leaves addressing it to future developments and to other negotiating arenas, such as the WTO and
the languishing Environmental Goods Agreement.93
5. Not Addressed. It is important to note that many important transnational environmental issues are not addressed by TPP. These include, at a minimum: air and water
pollution other than from ships; climate change and possible carbon taxes; desertification; environmental justice; fossil fuel subsidies; genetically modified organisms; hazardous wastes and toxic chemicals; indigenous environmental rights; nuclear waste; oil
and gas development; persistent organic pollutants; and wetlands preservation. Indeed,
four of the seven compulsory MEAs in the May 10th Agreement were left out of TPP: the
Inter-American Tropical Tuna Convention, the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands, the
International Whaling Convention, and the Convention on Conservation of Antarctic
Marine Living Resources.

E. Investor–State

Dispute Settlement
TPP continues the long term pattern of US-involved trade agreements having an investor–
state dispute settlement provision.94 In essence, this provision allows investors from a
member state who believe that an action taken by another member state has unjustly injured their investment in that state to bring a claim against the state for the loss incurred.
That claim is heard not by a court of the state where the action occurred, but instead by an
ad hoc three-member arbitration panel selected by the claimant and respondent that operates outside the legal system of the host state.
The proliferation of ISDS provisions has been highly controversial for a number of
reasons, including: (1) likely panel bias, since the arbitrators are often trade and commercial lawyers who work primarily for businesses rather than for governments or NGOs;
(2) arbitrariness, since there is no panel continuity or appellate system, together with a relatively low level of transparency and procedural protection as compared to courts in developed states; (3) protection of environmentally destructive investments (say tar sands
development) as well as environmentally benign or beneficial ones;95 and, perhaps most
importantly (4) concern that the risk of high penalties suppresses or “chills” environmental
and social regulation in host states, particularly poor ones.96 This is not an idle concern.
While the evidence regarding regulatory chill is too limited to support conclusions about
how widespread it is or how much it has affected environmental regulation overall, there

92

ibid. art. 20.18.3.
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World Trade Online (Feb. 11, 2018) https://perma.cc/58DW-HJXM.
94 TPP, ch. 9.
95 Solomon, “More Than a Dozen Environmental Organizations Warn of Trans-Pacific Partnership Risks.”
96 Kyla Tienhaara, “Regulatory Chill in a Warming World: The Threat to Climate Policy Posed by the TPP’s
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is certainly evidence of cases where it exists.97 Moreover, there are numerous documented
cases of investors directly threatening regulators with ISDS claims.
In partial response, the Investment chapter also provides an apparently broad shield for
environmental measures:
Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining
or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with this Chapter that it considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive
to environmental, health or other regulatory objectives.

Although this provision appears to be protective, research to date suggests that similar
provisions have not deterred many investors from bringing claims.98 The TPP Investment
chapter also provides for publication of notices, pleadings, hearing documentation, and
orders (subject to party claims that information is protected)99 and hearings open to the
public, except when protected information is discussed. Although modest, these are still
noteworthy movements in the direction of transparency.
While ISDS provisions provoke strong opposition from environmental, health, and
human rights groups, among others, and equally strong support from business groups,
knowledge about their empirical effects remains meagre. Jacobs argues that they are probably much less important than both sides presume, given that relatively few claims are
brought (slightly over forty each year recently) in relation to the amount of foreign investment (stock totaling USD 27 trillion in 2015).100 Foreign investors win approximately
one-quarter of the time, and average awards are generally quite small relative to claims
(somewhere between 3 and 10%). Nonetheless, serious concerns about arbitrariness, bias,
and chilling continue to haunt the TPP ISDS provision. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the CPTPP,
while retaining ISDS, suspends a number of provisions in the investment chapter.101 The
primary effect seems to be to exclude investment agreements between investors and states
from serving as grounds for ISDS claims under the Agreement.
Several alternatives to the current ISDS provision have been suggested. First, a complete
“carve-out” for environmental regulation could be adopted, similar to the one for tobacco
control measures which allows parties to shield them completely from ISDS claims.102
However, distinguishing environmental from non-environmental measures might be significantly more difficult, since environmental law can be found nearly everywhere.
A second possible reform would be to move away from the ad hoc structure of investment arbitration and to establish an investment court system with a dedicated group of trial
and appellate judges and to greater transparency. Both the EU’s proposals for TTIP and
97 Gus Van Harten and Dayna Nadine Scott, “Investment Treaties and the Internal Vetting of Regulatory
Proposals: A Case Study from Canada” (2016) 7 J Intl Dispute Settlement 92–116. See also Simon Lester, “Brady-
Lighthizer ISDS Exchange” (Mar. 21, 2018) Intl Econ Law & Policy Blog https://perma.cc/F57Z-QVPS.
98 Haydn Davies, “Investor-State Dispute Settlement and the Future of the Precautionary Principle” (2016) 5
British J Amer Legal Stud 449–86.
99 TPP, art. 9.24.1.
100 Lesley Jacobs, “Investor-State Dispute Mechanisms in International Economic Law: The Shifting Ground
for Meaningful Access to International Justice from Private Commercial Arbitration to Standing Tribunals and
Sectoral Carve-Outs” in Daniel Drache and Lesley A. Jacobs (eds.), Grey Zones of International Economic Law and
Global Governance (University of British Columbia Press 2018).
101 Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, Annex II—List of Suspended
Provisions.
102 TPP, art. 29.5.
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the signed CETA include such measures.103 The EU has announced that it is committed
to establishing a multilateral investment court and is pursuing it in all of its trade negotiations.104 However, while this approach might lead to greater consistency and predictability,
it remains to be seen whether the frequency and importance of claims will be sufficient to
persuade the many state parties involved to make the necessary financial and institutional
investments.
The final alternative would be simply to drop the ISDS provisions from modern trade
and economic agreements. Given the rapidly increasing requirements for internal institutional reform, and the relatively low number of cases actually brought, ISDS provisions may
not serve much purpose. This is especially so because the evidence that they significantly
enhance foreign investment is rather weak.105

F. Non-State Actors Beyond Investors
Although investors have a much larger role in TPP than all other types of non-state actors,
TPP also makes gestures toward recognizing the importance of the other non-state actors to
effective global environmental governance. Importantly, these actors are not ontologically
limited to purely “economic” roles in the way that investors are. Instead, they can also play
roles in formulating rules to protect the environment, human rights, and the like, as well as
monitoring, information dissemination, adjudication, enforcement, and evaluation of governance policies.
First, the agreement generally endorses corporate social responsibility (CSR):
Each Party should encourage enterprises operating within its territory or jurisdiction, to
adopt voluntarily, into their policies and practices, principles of corporate social responsibility that are related to the environment, consistent with internationally recognized standards and guidelines that have been endorsed or are supported by that Party.106

While this provision offers no concrete guidance and the “should” renders it hortatory, it
affords CSR a status in international trade discourse. CSR standard setting and reporting on
corporate environmental performance has the potential to provide significant impetus to
environmental performance.107 Yet whether TPP’s very soft endorsement is enough to spur
such movement is quite uncertain.
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Second, the Agreement recommends a variety of general “voluntary mechanisms” to enhance environmental performance, evidently referring to programs such as forestry and
fisheries certification.108 Again, it provides little specific guidance, instead offering up a set
of examples: “voluntary auditing and reporting, market based incentives, voluntary sharing
of information and expertise, and public-private partnerships.” However, it does use mandatory language:
[E]ach Party shall encourage: . . . use of flexible and voluntary mechanisms to protect natural resources and the environment . . . [and] its relevant authorities, businesses and business organizations, non-governmental organizations and other interested persons involved
in the development of criteria . . . to continue to develop and improve such criteria.109

Finally, it urges parties to encourage entities developing environmental product labels
to make sure they are accurate, scientifically sound, based on relevant international standards and best practices (echoing the TBT Agreement), innovation-enhancing, and non-
discriminatory as to origin.110 However modestly and schematically, these provisions
represent a significant recognition and acceptance of non-state actors’ roles in environmental governance, one which has grown quite rapidly in the past two decades.

IV. The TPP Environmental Provisions and Megaregulation
The megaregulation perspective posits that TPP is primarily an ordering project operating
on a megaregional scale. Presumptive hallmarks of that project include: (1) propagation
of a specific liberal vision of state-market relations; (2) facilitation of transnational business expansion and integration (market scaling) through alignment of national regulatory
systems; (3) megaregional economic and political integration; and (4) complex countering
of and engagement with China’s influence in the Asia-Pacific region.111 At a general level,
all of these characteristics are apparent in the environmental provisions described above.
This concluding section explores what they tell us about megaregulation and the political-
economic dynamics surrounding it.

A. State–Market

Relations
TPP envisions parties involving themselves in a broad range of environmental problems,
enforcing their environmental laws, strengthening them over time, and not waiving them
to garner increased trade or investment. They are expected to at least begin addressing certain problems closely tied to trade, including pollution from ships, invasive species, trade
108 See generally Errol Meidinger, “Multi-
Interest Self-Governance through Global Product Certification
Programmes” in Olaf Dilling, Martin Herberg, and Gerd Winter (eds.), Responsible Business: Self-Governance and
Law in Transnational Economic Transactions (Hart Publishing 2008).
109 TPP, arts. 20.11.a and 20.11.b.
110 ibid. art. 20.11.3.
111 Benedict Kingsbury and others, “The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) as Mega-Regulation: Prescriptions
for the State, Market Scaling, Mega-Region Building, and Geopolitical Ordering in the Asia Pacific” (Conference
Draft for ASIL Biennial Conference of the International Economic Law Interest Group 2016).
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in endangered and illegally harvested plants and animals, marine fisheries depletion, and
freer trade in environmental goods and services. However, as described above and in the
next section, they are to do so with a light touch, and at a distance from business. Economic
production and trade are the driving forces. Investors from one country who feel aggrieved
by regulation in another can bring their complaints to free-standing tribunals that have the
capacity to require regulating states to compensate them. Regulatory agencies are expected
to follow numerous procedures designed to make them open and responsive to regulated
interests.112 They are encouraged to conduct regulatory impact analyses and to adopt only
regulations whose measurable economic benefits exceed their costs. In addition, non-state
actors are encouraged to play a significant role in the formulation and enforcement of environmental rules, through such means as corporate responsibility and product certification
programs. While this composite of features could potentially be called neo-liberal, that label
tends to sweep aside the ways in which TPP portends an increase in the overall amount of
environmental regulation in many member countries, as well as increasing connectivity
and cooperation between the environmental ministries in those countries, thus very likely
leading to a denser regulatory environment.
This picture is consistent with, and amplified by, many other TPP provisions. The chapter
on state-owned enterprises (SOEs), for example, broadly seeks to place SOEs on a similar
footing to non-state-owned firms.113 The underlying idea is to move them toward a model
of economic actors operating within a common matrix of national and transnational regulation, and to limit state assistance to them to “commercial” forms, such as market rate loans
and market tested access to capital. Member countries are potentially liable for injuries
from non-commercial forms of assistance (after the effective date) through the TPP dispute settlement process,114 although what constitutes a compensable injury is hedged with
many invocations of “significant.”115 At the same time, TPP’s regulatory program does tend
to favor certain types of industries predominant in developed countries, such as finance,116
pharmaceutical products,117 and advanced technology generally118 through specific chapters. These chapters generally seek to protect the cross-border flow of investments, and are
additional manifestations of the alignment/market scaling process discussed in the next
section.

B. Regulatory Alignment Facilitating Market Scaling
The bulk of this chapter describes the ways in which TPP can be understood as promoting
megaregional alignment in environmental regulation. These include mandating high and
improving levels of environmental protection; adjudicating environmental complaints in TPP’s
dispute resolution process, thus backing them with potential trade sanctions; providing for
public information, notice and comment, complaints, adjudication, and sanctioning processes,
112 Stewart and Mertenskötter, “Megaregulatory Ordering through Transnational Administrative Law,” ch. 17
in this volume.
113 eg TPP, art. 17.4.
114 ibid. Annex 17-B.
115 ibid. arts. 17.7 and 17.8.
116 ibid. ch. 11: Financial Services.
117 ibid. Annex on Transparency and Procedural Fairness for Pharmaceutical Products and Medical Devices.
118 ibid. ch. 18: Intellectual Property.
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including non-state ones; banning environmental standards waivers aimed at increasing trade;
requiring measures to implement MEAs on ozone depletion, ship pollution, and endangered
species; developing policies for invasive species; protecting marine fisheries; limiting environmentally destructive subsidies; barring trade in illegally harvested fish, wildlife and plants;
building increased cooperation on environmentally beneficial technology, and promoting corporate responsibility, non-governmental standards programs, and eco-labeling, among other
things.
The above processes are likely to take place in a context where there already is a considerable amount of alignment, perhaps even harmonization, across member state environmental regulatory programs. While there appears to be limited scholarship on the question,
professional folklore suggests that there has been an enormous amount of international borrowing and mimicry in environmental law. This has been facilitated by the rise of the field
after the widespread establishment of rational-bureaucratic administrative states relying on
technical rules and expert agencies; the global publication of environmental rules and practices; and the global movement and interactions of environmental researchers, students,
officials, and activists. These developments allow scholars to talk about the diffusion of
regulatory instruments,119 global environmental law,120 reliance on common institutional
procedures,121 and the importance of transnational networks in the diffusion of regulatory
practices.122 Thus, in the domain of environmental regulation there may already be a larger
amount of alignment than is commonly assumed. Nonetheless, this still must be treated
as an empirical question. Understandably, given its practical difficulty and apparently low
promise of new theoretical insights, scholars have not concentrated on it.123 Practitioners
are likely to have a much better sense of the situation, but are not necessarily writing about it.
Regardless of how much alignment already exists, the question remains how TPP might
facilitate more of it. The Agreement relies on two main mechanisms: (1) legally mandated
regulatory programs and procedures, often backed by disputing processes and (2) repeated
transnational regulatory interactions, mainly through the committee system and the continuing regulatory networks that are likely to grow out of it. The underlying assumption of
the second mechanism seems to be the now-standard one in international law that repeated
interactions will lead to shared interpretations, which are then internalized and eventually become behaviorally binding.124 We can thus understand environmental alignment as
having two important features. The first is the fostering of a common set of legal goals and
procedures. Over time this should create legible channels for transnational trade and investment. The second is to knit together the large array of legal rules and officials across the
region to create links along which transactions can flow and shared understandings emerge.

119 Per-Olof Busch, Helge Jörgens, and Kerstin Tews, “The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Instruments: The
Making of a New International Environmental Regime” (2005) 598 Annals American Academy of Pol & Soc Sci
146–67.
120 Tseming Yang and Robert V. Percival, “The Emergence of Global Environmental Law” (2009) 36 Ecology L
Q 615–64.
121 Kenneth M. Murchison, “Environmental Law in Australia and the United States: A Comparative Overview”
(1995) 22(3) Boston College Environmental Affairs L Rev 503–61
122 Fabrizio De Francesco, “Diffusion of Regulatory Impact Analysis Among OECD and EU Member States”
(2012) 20 Comp Pol Stud 1–29.
123 George A. Berman and others, “Comparative Law: Problems and Prospects” (2011) 26(4) Amer Uni Intl L
Rev 935–68.
124 Harold Koh, “Transnational Legal Process” (1996) 75 Nebraska L Rev 181–207.
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Even with both developments, environmental regulation is likely to remain highly
complex, even labyrinthine. Most significant economic activities will be subject to a large
collection of regulatory requirements, which even if aligning, will still vary among (and
often within) member states. This condition will almost certainly advantage large transnational corporations, which can accumulate experience and expertise in navigating the
megaregional system. The continued unbundling of complex supply chains will be eased,
but will not be easy.

C. Megaregional Economic and Political Integration
Combined with TPP’s other provisions facilitating increased trade, easier capital flows, expanded and more similar intellectual property protections, and geographically extended
supply chains, the alignment dynamics described above can naturally be expected to foster
megaregional economic integration. This integration process has two sides—perhaps
Janus faced. One promotes the integration of member state regulatory programs through
the processes described in this chapter, and many others as well. The second facilitates the
continuing transnational extension of corporate supply chains and investment flows. The
market remains the foremost ordering mechanism. Governments accommodate and facilitate integration by aligning their regulatory systems. As cross-border transactions proliferate, political-economic integration ramifies and solidifies.

D. Countering of and Engagement with China
TPP’s model of environmental regulation as described in this chapter is very different from
the currently operative Chinese model. The draft RCEP reportedly contains no binding environmental protection provisions,125 nor do most of China’s existing trade agreements,126
with the apparent exception of its agreement with ASEAN.127 Although China has an extensive body of environmental law, recent Chinese practice has been to eschew legal rules
in favor of “cadre evaluation,” the Chinese system for top-down bureaucratic personnel assessments, to set high-priority, quantitative environmental targets. These are ‘designed to
mobilize governors, mayors, and state-owned enterprise leaders in every corner of China’s
massive bureaucracy.”128 While China has made significant strides in environmental protection over the past decade, it has done so not by enforcing its environmental laws, but instead by enforcing performance targets for high officials. Notably, the setting of targets was
not new, their enforcement was. Thus, the Chinese approach is a highly discretionary one
relying on relatively quickly adjustable top-level priority setting.
125 Sam Cossar-Gilbert, “5 Hidden Costs of the RCEP to People and Planet” The Diplomat (Oct. 12, 2017)
https://perma.cc/Z8BS-3NCN.
126 Chow, “How the United States Uses the Trans-
Pacific Partnership to Contain China in International
Trade” 377.
127 Anuradha, “WTO to the TPP” 246.
128 Alex L. Wang, “The Search for Sustainable Legitimacy: Environmental Law and Bureaucracy in China” 37(2)
Harvard Environmental L Rev 365–440. “[B]ureaucratic cadre mandates, not laws and regulations, are at the core
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TPP’s approach, by contrast, aims at fostering a predictable, transnationally legible environmental regulatory system in which many types of interests—especially sophisticated businesses—can have an influence, and which acts relatively deliberately and slowly.
Corporations can then maneuver through the megaregional regulatory system with some
degree of navigational confidence. It is impossible to predict how these two very different
approaches will interact in the future, especially since China has indicated some interest
in joining the CPTPP,129 but it is possible to predict that alignment will be a complicated
process, and one might produce novel, hybrid forms of megaregional environmental
regulation.

V. Conclusion
The driving mission of TPP is to facilitate transnational trade, investment, and value
chain expansion on terms congenial to Western-style businesses, and to do so by creating
a megaregional regulatory order that protects those activities. Through the many discrete
provisions described in this chapter, TPP seeks to foster a model of a rational and liberal
state deploying predictable and moderate environmental regulation that is internationally
aligned through common procedures and interactions among officials, businesses, and activists. This model represents an important step forward by making trade policy inseparable
from environmental regulation.
The larger dream is that trade expansion driving regional integration might become an
engine of sustainable environmental protection. Given the very modest, incremental environmental regulatory program embodied in the TPP, however, the dream is very likely a
fantasy. It will require other strong regulatory programs, deployed by both states and non-
state actors, to nest the trading system in a governance framework capable of controlling the
relentless degradation of the planet by ever-intensifying economic activity.

129 Ernesto Londoño and Motoko Rich, “US Allies Sign Sweeping Trade Deal in Challenge to Trump” New York
Times (New York, Mar. 8, 2018).

